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Research
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Introduction
Since 2001, social scientists and security agencies around the world have 
proposed several frameworks designed to explain the process of radical-
ization into violent extremism (RVE), generally, or into militant Islam-
ism, specifically. Primarily, these efforts are conceptual, rather than 
empirical, and with very few exceptions have not been coherently guided 
Abstract
Over the past decade, analysts have proposed several frameworks to 
explain the process of radicalization into violent extremism (RVE). These 
frameworks are based primarily on rational, conceptual models which are 
neither guided by theory nor derived from systematic research. This arti-
cle reviews recent (post-9/11) conceptual models of the radicalization pro-
cess and recent (post-9/11) empirical studies of RVE. It emphasizes the 
importance of distinguishing between ideological radicalization and ter-
rorism involvement, though both issues deserve further empirical inquiry. 
Finally, it summarizes some recent RVE-related research efforts, identi-
fies seven things that social science researchers and operational personnel 
still need to know about violent radicalization, and offers a set of starting 
assumptions to move forward with a research agenda that might help to 
thwart tomorrow's terrorists.
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by social science theories. Instead, these conceptual models typically offer 
a logical, descriptive narrative of a "typical" transformative process, often 
with reference to a particular extremist group, a specific incident, or a 
couple of cases. Nevertheless, some of these efforts may be useful for 
organizing the concepts, mechanisms, and processes involved in violent 
extremism.
The preceding Part I article examined the basic concepts of RVE, 
including the terms radicalization and radicalism, the framing of RVE as 
a pathway rather than as an event, and the possible utility of social science 
theories for understanding the RVE process and the embedded social-
cognitive mechanisms that might facilitate violent action. The present 
Part II article continues the inquiry, picking up where the first part left 
off. The following sections will review recent (post-9/11) conceptual 
models of the radicalization process and recent (post-9/11) empirical 
studies of RVE. This review is offered with the understanding that each 
model remains underdeveloped: none of them yet has a very firm social-
scientific basis as an established "cause" of terrorism, and few of them 
have been subjected to any rigorous scientific or systematic inquiry.
This analysis—like its Part I counterpart—also carries an important 
caveat: Radicalization does not equate with terrorism. Most people who 
hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists—even 
those who lay claim to a "cause"—are not deeply ideological and may not 
"radicalize" in any traditional sense. Radicalizing by developing or adopt-
ing extremist beliefs that justify violence is one possible pathway into ter-
rorism involvement, but it is certainly not the only one. The broader 
question is how people become involved, stay involved, and sometimes 
disengage from terrorism. The objectives of this review, therefore, are 
simply to aggregate existing knowledge and stimulate new ideas that 
might lead us to ask better questions about the RVE process.
Conceptual Models of Radicalization into 
Violent Extremism
In an article first published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Borum 
proposed a four-stage conceptual model for the emergence of a "terrorist 
mindset." The concepts were derived from analyses (though anecdotal 
and unsystematic) of multiple violent extremist groups with a span of 
diverse ideologies in an attempt to discern whether some common factors 
might exist among them in the processes of radicalization. The conceptual 
model attempts to explain how grievances and vulnerabilities are trans-
formed into hatred of a target group, and how hatred is transformed—for 
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some—into a justification or impetus for violence. Fundamentally, the 
four-stage process begins by framing some unsatisfying event, condition, 
or grievance (It's not right) as being unjust (It's not fair). The injustice is 
blamed on a target policy, person, or nation (It's your fault). The respon-
sible party is then vilified—often demonized—(You're Evil), which facili-
tates justification or impetus for aggression. The model was developed 
originally as a training heuristic for law enforcement, not as a formal 
social science theory.1 
Figure 1: Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset
Moghaddam, drawing broadly from a variety of psychological constructs, 
developed the "Staircase to Terrorism" as a metaphor for the process of 
violent radicalization.2 The "staircase" narrows as it ascends from the 
ground floor and through five successive levels. As in most popular 
models, Moghaddam argues that feelings of discontent and perceived 
adversity (framed as perceived deprivation) form the foundation and fuel 
for stepping initially onto the path to terrorism. Fewer and fewer people 
ascend to each successive level, though, leaving a relatively small number 
of people who actually progress to the point where they engage in 
terrorism.
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Figure 2: Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism
According to Moghaddam's model, people begin with a desire to alleviate 
adversity and improve their situation. Unsuccessful attempts, however, 
lead to frustration, producing feelings of aggression, which are displaced 
onto some perceived causal agent (who is then regarded as an enemy). As 
their anger towards the enemy builds, some become increasingly sympa-
thetic towards violent, extremist ideology and to the terrorist groups that 
act against them. Some of those sympathizers eventually join an extremist 
group, organization, or movement that advocates for, and perhaps 
engages in, terrorist violence. At the "top" or final level among those who 
have joined are those who overcome any barriers to action and actually 
commit a terrorist act.3
One of the most widely circulated models of Jihadi-Salafi radicalization 
came from the New York Police Department's (NYPD) Intelligence Divi-
sion, with input from terrorism researchers and other experts. The NYPD 
report suggested that citizens of a Western home-country who ultimately 
adopt a Jihadi-Salafi ideology do so through a linear four-stage process 
which aligns closely with the terminology and sequence used in the FBI 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/3
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2</p>Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research
41
model (Silber & Bhatt, 2007): Self-Identification; Indoctrination; and 
Jihadization.4 According to the report, Pre-radicalization characterizes 
the period before an individual is exposed to jihadi-Salafi ideology. Self-
Identification marks the process of exploring Salafi Islam, adopting its 
ideological tenets, and affiliating with its proponents. Indoctrination is 
the intensification stage, both for the individual's beliefs and for his com-
mitment to the ideas, to action, and to his like-minded collective. Finally, 
rather than referring to the end stage as "action," the NYPD model calls it 
Jihadization, but the character of the stage is essentially the same as in 
the FBI assessment. The hallmark is the individual's acceptance of, and 
commitment to, his individual duty to act on behalf of the cause.
Figure 3: NYPD Model of Jihadization
European researchers have been exploring the RVE problem for at least 
as long as American researchers, and often with a greater sense of 
urgency. Precht, in a qualitative review commissioned by the Danish Min-
istry of Justice, summarized the broad contours of radicalization in the 
following way:
"Radicalisation often starts with individuals who are frustrated 
with their lives, society or the foreign policy of their governments. 
A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded 
people, and together they go through a series of events and 
phases that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, only a 
few end up becoming terrorists. The rest stop or drop out of the 
radicalisation process at different phases."5
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Precht's report outlines a four-phase "typical pattern of radicalization" 
that also parallels the conceptual models advanced by the FBI and the 
NYPD Intelligence Unit, the stages of which he calls: Pre-radicalization; 
Conversion and identification with radical Islam; Indoctrination and 
increased group bonding; and Actual acts of terrorism or planned plots. 
Precht notes, however, that small group dynamics and identification are 
often powerful accelerants of commitment to extremist ideology.
Figure 4: Precht's Model of a "Typical" Radicalization Pattern
Precht also sought to identify and analyze the factors influencing the mili-
tant Islamist radicalization process in Europe. The report outlines three 
categories of motivational factors for radicalization.
•   The first is "Background Factors," which include personal struggles 
with religious identity, experiences with discrimination, and lack of 
social integration.
•   The second category Precht calls "Trigger Factors," to include people—
such as a mentor or charismatic leader—and events—such as policy 
actions—that might provoke or incite either antipathy or activism.
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•   The third category is that of "Opportunity Factors," which account for 
an individual's degree of access and likelihood of exposure to extremist 
ideas or adherents within her or his sphere of activity. These include 
physical and virtual spaces such as the Internet, mosques, penal insti-
tutions, and social groups/collectives.6
From his analysis, Precht makes the following conclusion:
"Largely, homegrown terrorism can be viewed as a sociological 
phenomenon where issues such as belonging, identity, group 
dynamics, and values are important elements in the transforma-
tion process. Religion plays an important role, but for some it 
rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals. A common 
denominator seems to be that the involved persons are at a cross-
road in their life and wanting a cause."7
Though the conceptual models posed by NYPD and Precht are certainly 
consistent with each other and have become quite popular among some 
law enforcement groups, they seem more appropriately to describe a lin-
ear sequence of stages rather than a "process" or pathway. Moreover, the 
accuracy and stability of this type of sequence model has not been rigor-
ously tested. Despite the idea's intuitive appeal, it may be premature to 
conclude that RVE always—or even generally—progresses though a series 
of discrete stages.
In 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a 
Washington, D.C.-based think tank, was tasked by the U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence's Intelligence Science Board to convene a confer-
ence of invited experts to study the "hearts and minds" aspect of the prob-
lem of radicalization. The CSIS staff did not initiate any independent 
empirical data collection, but staff attempted to synthesize the plurality of 
opinion that existed among presenters and attendees. The report of that 
conference begins with the observation that:
"There is a lack of clear understanding or consensus on what 
motivates an individual to become a terrorist and to engage in 
violent acts. Without such an understanding, we are limited in 
our ability to employ appropriate strategies and tools for 
preempting terrorism."8
Drawing on views expressed at the conference, the report constructs a 
framework for understanding radicalization based on "three overlapping, 
but distinct elements that motivate individuals to becoming radicalized or 
committing terrorist acts," which they describe as follows:
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•   The ideas of the radical narrative that provide a filter for understanding 
the world;
•   The sociological factors that compel an individual to embrace this radi-
cal narrative; and
•   The psychological factors, characteristics, pathologies, and triggers that 
may prompt an individual to use violence in order to promote or con-
summate this narrative.
The CSIS report further suggests that neither demographic nor socio-
economic factors emerge as strong predictors of radicalization. Feelings 
of shame and humiliation, the report says, often serve to forge a bond 
between a vulnerable individual and a charismatic leader, and catalyze 
acceptance of the radical narrative and its associated values and attitudes. 
Travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan seemed to be one of the most consistent 
behavioral factors observed among those who became radicalized into 
violent extremism. The CSIS effort, however, did not propose a specific 
process model for radicalization.
Attempting to take a somewhat broader and more integrative approach, 
psychologists and behavioral scientists at the Joint Military Information 
Support Center (JMISC) surveyed existing conceptual models of radical-
ization and associated empirical research, attempting to create an inte-
grated analytic framework. Their working definitions drew largely from 
the work of McCauley and Moskalenko, viewing radicalization generally 
as "increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict and 
violence." An individual's escalating commitment is ostensibly driven by 
changes in "beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly 
justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the 
ingroup."9 It is explicitly a model framed around conflict between groups.
Unlike some other linear, sequential models, however, the JMISC frame-
work sought as a foundation to identify the major components of the rad-
icalization process that different models appeared to have in common. 
They identified the following seven interacting components:
•   Motivations: Motivations may or may not be the ultimate "why" of ter-
rorist activity, but in this model they do function as an initial impetus. 
Motivations are composed of both "push" factors, such as grievances, 
and "pull" factors, which may serve as instrumental (e.g., money) or 
expressive (e.g., perceived importance) incentives.
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•   Socially-Facilitated Entry: Several studies have observed that a per-
son's introduction to extremist ideas and to an extremist collective very 
often occur through family and kinship networks or social institutions, 
such as schools, religious training centers, or sometimes prisons. The 
inferred common wisdom has been that the initial bond of relationship 
usually precedes the acceptance of extremist ideas. Growing through 
connections also adds a layer of screening and security to cautious 
groups who may be engaged in subversion.
•   Splintering/Progression: The framework recognizes that becoming a 
violent extremist is typically not an abrupt, one-time decision, but one 
that occurs incrementally over time. This is the "progression" refer-
enced in this component's label. One might view this as a gradual esca-
lation, or as a series of discrete actions or decisions that prime an 
individual for what should occur at the next level.
•   Intensification: Because this is a group-based framework, an individ-
ual's increase in extremity and deepening of commitment are believed 
to be driven primarily by in-group socialization. Group leader influence 
and dynamics among its members shape the individual's thoughts, feel-
ings, and behaviors toward those of the group and nurture intolerance 
for those outside the group.
•   Ideology: The role of ideology in violent extremism is a matter of some 
controversy, but in this model the core of the ideology is a narrative 
that follows some form of a script about something that is wrong/"not 
right" and some person or entity being to blame for it.
•   Threat/Defense: Out-group threat is a key factor binding the in-group 
together. This is a key element of the narrative that suggests violence is 
necessary to defend the cause or the in-group and that rationalizes 
offensive action as "defensive."
•   Belonging/Identity: This element recognizes that people sometimes 
are drawn to violent extremist ideologies and groups because they feel a 
need for belonging or because they lack some kind of identity or a sense 
of personal meaning, which group affiliation can provide.10
Whereas the NYPD stage model focuses on individual transformation and 
works from an assumption that radicalization is a "bottom-up" process of 
"joining," the Danish intelligence service (PET) has a phase model that 
focuses more on the influencer/"radicalizer," placing greater emphasis on 
"top-down" processes of radicalization. Veldhuis and Staun describe 
PET's model in the following way:
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"The process starts by being 'susceptible' to radical ideas and 
meeting a 'radicaliser,' and advances on to new religious practices 
and changed behaviour. Subsequently, the process involves a nar-
rowing of the person's circle of friends and family and results in 
the so-called 'hardening phase,' which includes 'reviewing of and 
interest in very violent videos' displaying terrorists in battle and 
the killing of hostages."11
Recent Empirical Research on Radicalization
Despite the surge in terrorism-related publications since 2001 and the 
burst of recent interest in radicalization, empirical studies are rare. But 
knowledge development achieved through science ideally should be a sys-
tematic, incremental, and cumulative process. It should consider what 
information to gather from what sources (to ensure we are measuring 
what is most important, and doing so as accurately as possible), how to 
gather and record the information (so that it is consistent across the 
cases), and how to use and interpret that information to test assumptions 
and hypotheses (so that we are not just "fitting" the information to our 
preconceived notions). Some of the conceptual models seem rather sensi-
ble, and potentially useful, but they are not in complete agreement. Con-
ceptual models—whether or not they are empirically validated—can have 
a significant "real world" impact. However, persons charged with trying to 
prevent terrorism should have the best knowledge possible so they have a 
sound basis on which to make the best decisions. So which "sensible" 
approach should be followed, and can it be assumed that each of the mod-
els is equally sensible for assessing any given offender in any given con-
text? This is where systematic inquiry really comes in handy. Anecdotal 
observations may be useful. More useful are systematic, carefully drawn 
stories and lessons. Such systematic work begins to approximate general-
ized, empirically-derived knowledge. That kind of knowledge is what is 
desperately needed at this juncture, both to advance our understanding of 
radicalization processes and to guide operational assumptions about how 
violent extremists sustain and grow their collectives.
Recent empirical inquiries have used a range of methodologies and 
approaches. Most have relied on historical biographical information from 
various news sources and public documents. Some researchers have 
directly interviewed violent extremists (mostly either in open discourse or 
with semi-structured protocols). Some have blended both approaches.
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Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA Case Officer, has 
reviewed and collected information from media and open-source docu-
ments (e.g., courtroom testimony) on several hundred Al-Qaida-related 
cases. Sageman has published most of his analysis in his two books: 
Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad. He suggests most 
of the militants came from middle class families with secular upbringing 
and education. They had some college-level education, but often worked 
in unskilled occupations. They mostly joined the movement while in their 
early twenties and often as expatriates. Most were married, many had 
children, and rarely did they have significant criminal backgrounds. Sage-
man characterizes their radicalization as a "bottom-up" process popu-
lated by "Young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory, and sense of 
belonging to group and cause," who mobilize through social networks. 
This is sometimes referred to as Sageman's "bunch of guys" theory of rad-
icalization.12 These collectives, he finds, often share a sense of global or 
local "moral outrage" and grievous personal experiences, and are driven 
more by Anti-American and Anti-Semitic sentiment than by deep Islamic 
doctrine.
Similarly, Thomas Hegghammer analyzed two hundred and forty biogra-
phies—including seventy "extensive" ones—of (post-2002) Saudi mili-
tants, compiled over a two-year period from a broad range of primary and 
secondary sources, mostly in Arabic. He also conducted numerous inter-
views with former radicals, as well as families and acquaintances of mili-
tants. He framed the analyses to ask who joined "al-Qaida on the Arabian 
Peninsula" (AQAP) and why, and—to facilitate comparisons—what radi-
calization and recruitment factors might be specific to Saudi Arabia.
The militants in Hegghammer's sample—almost all males—were mainly 
in their late twenties (average age of twenty-seven), many of whom were 
veterans of al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan and armed jihad in 
Bosnia. Some of the wives had accompanied their husbands to the AQAP 
campaign, but none were directly involved in attack operations. A sub-
stantial majority were Saudi nationals, but their geographic and tribal dis-
tribution was widely distributed throughout the country—not 
concentrated in particularly conservative or particularly poor regions. 
Most had a high-school education, roughly comparable to the education 
level of the general Saudi (male) working population, and very few had a 
pre-radicalization criminal record. A number of them had served prison 
time for extremist-related offenses.
Hegghammer also observed that the older veterans of Afghanistan (before 
1996) had a certain cohesiveness among them as a result of their shared 
training and combat experiences. In particular, he notes that AQ training 
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camp recruits between 1996 and 2001 "underwent four important and 
interlinked processes: violence acculturation, indoctrination, training, 
and relations-building. These processes are the key to understanding the 
extremism, ideology, abilities, and intra-group loyalty of the militants 
who returned from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia in late 2001."13
Qualitatively, Hegghammer groups their roles into three categories. First 
are the "top commanders," who were "lifestyle jihadists" who came to 
Afghanistan as teens, worked through al-Qaida's growth in the 1990s, and 
had practical experience with armed jihad. Second are the "ideologues" 
with no battle experience, only religious training and mediocre achieve-
ments. Third are the "fighters"—a diverse group composed of young jihad 
veterans, older veterans (who couldn't lead) coming out of retirement, 
and new recruits. They had a mix of political (more nationalist than 
social-revolutionary), religious, and personal motivations, and often 
embarked on a radical path even before enlisting in AQAP.
Bakker collected information on a sample of more than two hundred 
terrorists and their networks to examine their characteristics and the 
circumstances in which they became involved in militant jihadism. 
Between 2001 and 2006, these individuals had been involved in thirty-
one operations within Europe.14 They varied widely in age from sixteen to 
fifty-nine years old, but most were in their mid-twenties while engaged in 
militant jihadist activity. Nearly all were European residents (and joined 
the armed jihad in their resident countries), but most were from non-
European countries of origin, mainly North Africa. More than half were 
from the lower socio-economic strata, perhaps reflecting the general 
status of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe. Fewer than one in 
four were raised in religious families, and another quarter were converts 
to Islam. Nearly a third are estimated to have completed college. Fifteen 
percent were unemployed, and almost a third worked in unskilled or 
semi-skilled jobs. Only one in three appeared to be single at the time of 
his arrest. Nearly one in four had a prior criminal conviction, sometimes 
for illegal weapons possession, and perhaps 5% were known to have a 
mental illness of some type. About 20% were related through kinship, and 
another 18% by friendship and social bonds, emphasizing the importance 
of social networks in facilitating entry into the militant Islamist 
movement.
With a more in-depth and individualized focus, John Horgan recently 
conducted a series of fifty-two semi-structured interviews (with twenty-
nine former terrorists and twenty-three of their supporters, family mem-
bers, and friends) over an eighteen-month period from late 2006 to early 
2008, producing some deeply personal, detailed, and complex portrayals 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/3
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2</p>Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research
49
of former terrorists in Belfast, Beirut, Oslo, London, Paris, Tripoli, and 
Jakarta. Horgan has long espoused the research merits of directly inter-
viewing former terrorists, particularly to illuminate questions at an indi-
vidual level.15
Horgan has led much of the research into what is known as terrorist dis-
engagement—an individual's departure from terrorist-related activity.16 
As a result of his research interviews, he concluded that terrorists can 
and—not infrequently—do disengage from violence, but often without 
abandoning their radical views, and sometimes even without "leaving" or 
disavowing the group. This can be a rather complex process. Terrorists do 
not abruptly and spontaneously "de-radicalize;" but over time and as a 
result of certain experiences, they often reassess the necessity and justifi-
cations for violence, and lose faith in the tactic of terrorism. As he 
explored that transformation in some depth, Horgan found a very com-
mon theme: people often leave after becoming intensely disillusioned 
with the reality of life in terrorist movements. Sometimes this is because 
the fantasy of a terrorist life is more dynamic and appealing than the real-
ity of living it. At other times, the burden of their own internal moral lim-
its clash with the ethos of the group, leading them to reflect more deeply 
on the group and its behavior.
Even as Horgan suggests that "push" and "pull" factors both operate in 
the radicalization process, he finds these factors involved in 
disengagement as well. Among the major "push" factors, disillusionment 
was a clear standout. People became disillusioned that perhaps the 
group's ideals or objectives were ultimately unattainable; that the violent 
methods or persons victimized were not completely legitimate; or that the 
leaders and group dynamics were flawed with jealousies and other human 
imperfections. In some cases, terrorists became disillusioned with their 
own suppressed or diminished status within the movement. Beyond 
disillusionment, some succumbed to the accumulation of stress and 
pressures attendant to the terrorist lifestyle. Others wrestled profoundly 
with group loyalties and demands that competed with family bonds and 
obligations.
Among the more alluring "pull" factors, some former militants were look-
ing to escape the lifestyle pressures and normalize their lives. Some 
wanted to start families, free from terrorist group competition. Others 
were attracted by the incentives of "rehabilitation" or "alternatives" pro-
grams that offered education, employment assistance, new social net-
works, and sometimes even economic relief—all in exchange for shedding 
the burden of terrorist-related activity.
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Slootman and Tillie explored the early process of radicalization in 
Amsterdam, focusing on antecedent ideas and beliefs, as well as possible 
reasons for radicalization.17 They used data from the Amsterdam Resi-
dent Monitor, which is a representative survey taken among nearly three 
thousand Amsterdam residents, including 321 Muslims. They did a fol-
low-up qualitative inquiry with twenty-four Amsterdam youths "on the 
verge of radicalizing," and twelve Muslim youth who already had com-
pleted the radicalization process. Their analyses revealed two uncorre-
lated themes among reasons for radicalization.18 One is a very orthodox 
religious stance, which they refer to as the religious dimension; and the 
other is a set of beliefs that are mistrustful of the established order and 
find it troubling that Muslims in Dutch society are treated unjustly, which 
they call the political dimension. The religious and political dimensions 
are empirically independent of each other—one does not necessarily lead 
to the other. Amsterdam Muslims, however, who have strong sentiments 
in both dimensions appear to have an increased probability of radicaliza-
tion. In addition, their qualitative investigation of radicalized or radicaliz-
ing youth suggested three non-independent paths to radicalization, which 
they describe in the following way:
•   Need for meaning and stability: Islam for order and calm
These are the respondents who were not active in Islam before their 
conversion, and for whom the step to practicing Islam meant a radi-
cal break with their old lifestyle. This old life is seen as negative and 
meaningless now that they actively practice Islam.
•   Need for commitment: Islam brings acceptance and security
These are the respondents who were outsiders before, but now feel 
accepted as they are with their new friends in the mosque. These are 
the youngest respondents. They are good boys who at a young age 
began practicing Islam more actively than their classmates or 
parents.
•   Need for justice: Islam as a reaction to injustice
These young men have a strong feeling that Muslims are being dis-
criminated against. They observe things that they consider to be 
unjust. This can be anything from a brother who is hassled by the 
police or the current events in Iraq or Palestine.19
In 2006, Professors Peter Neumann and Brooke Rogers of King's College, 
London were commissioned by the European Commission's Directorate 
General for Justice, Freedom and Security to study recruitment and 
mobilization for the militant Islamist movement in Europe. Their 
approach to the ten-month study included a literature review and field-
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work, including nearly forty semi-structured interviews with law enforce-
ment and intelligence officials, community leaders, and radicals/former 
radicals residing in three EU countries (France, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom).
Though their results were largely qualitative, they did reach some descrip-
tive conclusions on current European trends in Islamist recruitment and 
mobilization. Key findings included the following:
•   European mosques, once a hub for the propagation of extremist ideas 
and rhetoric, are no longer prominent in their presence or influence. 
Increased scrutiny by security agencies has instead driven extremist 
activists "underground," where they are more difficult to detect and 
monitor.
•   The influence of radical imams (who tend to appeal more to converts) 
also seems to be waning, especially in Southern Europe, but other 
Islamist activists have replaced them as mobilizers or "engines" of 
Islamist militant recruitment. Activists tend especially to exploit con-
flicts of role and identity among young Muslims to align them with 
extremist subgroups and against the West. Linguistic and identity 
issues, however, are less salient among Muslims in Southern Europe 
(as opposed, for example, to the U.K. and France), where Muslim 
immigration is more recent.
•   With the declining attraction of radical mosques, there is increasing 
concern about what happens in "places of vulnerability," such as pris-
ons or other social institutions in which marginalized individuals are 
likely to feel lost or experience tensions. Neumann and Rogers also 
express concern about "gateway organizations" of Islamist activism, 
which may facilitate exposure and connection to militant ideas and the 
social influence of people who endorse them.
•   The Internet has come to play an increasingly important role in recruit-
ment and mobilization, particularly appealing to "seekers" and facili-
tating "home-grown" self-starter groups. The report suggests that effort 
be directed to deter the formation and action of "recruitment magnets" 
(which may be activists or places) that connect self-starters to the 
broader movement.20
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman from the Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies attempted a recent study of radicalization in the U.S. and 
U.K.. They observed, "To date, no study has empirically examined the 
process through which these terrorists are radicalizing, which constitutes 
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a substantial gap in the literature." They aimed to address that gap 
"through an empirical examination of behavioral manifestations of the 
radicalization process in 117 homegrown 'jihadist' terrorists from the 
United States and United Kingdom."21
They describe their sample of cases as comprising persons participating in 
or supporting jihadist terrorist plots who either spent a significant portion 
of their formative years in the West, or whose "radicalization bears a sig-
nificant connection to the West." Though the report clearly identifies—by 
name—which persons were included in the sample, it does not very spe-
cifically describe the sources of information, the coding strategy (if any) 
that was used, or the reliability of judgments about whether or not a given 
factor was present in a given case. They do say that they relied "wherever 
possible on their (the subjects') own words," derived from blogs and 
Internet postings, as well as some court documents and "credible open-
source information that would be accepted in the professional and aca-
demic worlds." The standard for that acceptance is not specified.
The researchers began the study by outlining six potentially observable 
"manifestations of the radicalization process," each of which they claim 
"occurred frequently enough among the sample to be considered signifi-
cant." The six factors examined and reported are as follows:
•   Adopting a Legalistic (Rules-Based) Interpretation of Islam
•   Trusting Only Select (and Ideologically Rigid) Religious Authorities
•   Perceived (Incompatible) Schism Between Islam and the West
•   Low Tolerance for (and Personalized Reaction against) Perceived 
Theological Deviance
•   Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others
•   Political Radicalization (Western Conspiracy to Subjugate Islam)
Reviewing these cases led the authors to several "insights" about the radi-
calization process. First, consistent with findings from other studies, 
there was no discernible "profile" of persons radicalized into violent 
extremism. The authors' demographic observations, however, diverged 
from those found in other samples—such as Marc Sageman's collection of 
non-Western cases. While Sageman has reported that Salafi Jihadists 
may be more educated, and more secure fiscally and occupationally than 
has been previously believed, those in Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman's 
sample were less frequently married, of a less privileged socioeconomic 
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upbringing, and had both a weaker educational background and weaker 
professional prospects. Demographically, they were not dissimilar to Heg-
ghammer's sample of AQAP militants.
Second, Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman concluded that religion and 
theological understanding may factor prominently into only a subset of 
cases. In the process of becoming radicalized, one in five were known to 
have a spiritual mentor. One in four claimed to have a spiritual sanctioner 
for their planned attack, but less than 40 percent claimed explicitly that 
their illegal actions were religiously motivated.22 The perception that a 
schism exists between Islam and the West appeared in many cases to be 
an important aspect of the radicalization process.
Third, while prisons did not factor prominently into most radicalization 
processes (a connection was found in only seven of the 117 cases studied), 
overseas training was fairly common. More than 40% were known to have 
traveled abroad for jihad-related training.
Jyette Klausen from Brandeis University has also developed, based on 
public documents, "a dataset of Jihadists based or operating in the West, 
including some three hundred and fifty U.K. residents or individuals 
engaged in terrorism targeting the U.K., who were arrested between 1999 
and 2010."23 The British jihadists came from thirty-two different coun-
tries. Nearly a third had other jihadist supporters in their kinship net-
works (family or friend), and 80 percent of the militants were connected 
to social networks that traced back to just four prominent Islamist leaders 
(Sheiks) in London. Their mean age for first arrest was twenty-six years 
old, but typically an arrest would not occur for two–three years or more 
after radicalization. Only sixteen of the three hundred and fifty were 
women, and fewer than one in ten were converts to Islam (~8% in Britain 
and ~16% in the United States).
In 2009, the Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR) at 
Aarhus University in Denmark issued a series of research reports study-
ing the phenomenon of Islamism and the contours of radicalization pro-
cesses. They focused their study efforts on middle-size European cities, 
with specific initiatives in Lille (France) (Beski-Chafiq, et al.), Leicester 
(U.K.) (Githens-Mazer, et al.), Parma and Verona (Italy) (Della Porta & 
Bosi), and Aarhus (Denmark) (Kuhle & Lindekilde). While most of the 
investigations used qualitative interviews with select samples, Goli and 
Rezaei took a very different approach to defining and exploring what it 
means to be a "Radical Muslim." They devised a 108-item survey that was 
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administered by telephone to a nationally representative sample of 1,113 
persons aged fifteen–thirty in Denmark. Most were immigrants, and the 
sample was fairly evenly divided between males and females.
Goli and Rezaei took an empirical approach to defining radicalism by cat-
egorizing respondents into four ranked groups, with Group Four being 
the most radical (expressing Radical Islamic views in terms of expressive, 
explicit, and consistent affiliation with and support for militant radical 
Muslim groups). Persons in this group, whom they labeled as "Radical 
Muslims," comprised only 5.6% of the total sample and met the following 
four requirements:24
1.  Advocate for Islam as a religious ideology.
2. Join the interpretation of Islam as holistic, distinguishing between true 
and false Islam, acknowledging Islam as a binding prescription for 
activities in Din [Religion], Dunya [Way of life], and Dawla 
[Government].
3. Submit to the idea that the final goal of Islam is conquest of the entire 
world.
4. Agree that fulfilling that end legitimizes the use of any means, including 
violence.
Goli and Rezaei found the Group Four "Radical Muslims" were predomi-
nantly Sunni (70%), disproportionately male (76%), and most often were 
in the twenty-one to twenty-four-year-old age range (38%). Converts were 
overrepresented, but still accounted for only 10% of the radical group.25 
There was no relationship between income and support for the Radical 
Islamic worldview. They also distinguished themselves from other Mus-
lims in the sample on a number of other dimensions. Specially, the Radi-
cal Muslims were (among other things):
•   More dissatisfied with life in general;
•   More preoccupied with the international conflicts in Muslim countries;
•   Lonelier;
•   More likely to have experienced discrimination;
•   Less trustful of Danish media;
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•   More likely to want to marry only another Muslim;
•   More likely to believe all Muslim immigrants should follow Islam;
•   Opposed to certain behaviors, such as drinking alcohol, which are pro-
hibited by Sharia law;
•   More likely to have become more religious within the past three years; 
and
•   More committed to religious duties like paying Zakat and Khoms, daily 
prayer, etc.
Finally, another standout, detailed study within the limited empirical lit-
erature on violent radicalization among militant Islamists was conducted, 
not by academics, but ostensibly by behavioral researchers in a U.K. Gov-
ernment security service. As reported in The Guardian, their analysis is 
based on in-depth case studies of "several hundred individuals known to 
be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist activity" rang-
ing from fundraising to planning suicide bombings in the U.K. The 
Guardian notes that they published an "operational briefing note" in 
June 2008 titled: "Understanding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 
in the UK." The document is reportedly marked as "U.K.-restricted," but 
its contents have been widely reported in the British media. According to 
press reports, among the key findings, the U.K. agency notes that no pro-
file or single pathway to extremism existed. In most cases they note that 
some vulnerability existed that made the person receptive to the ideology, 
but as with earlier studies, the process of becoming "radicalized" appears 
to have occurred incrementally over time, not as a discrete event.26
Moving Forward in Understanding Radicalization 
into Violent Extremism
Both social scientists and law enforcement professionals—for the most 
part, at least—seem to have set aside the fallacious notions that violent 
extremists are all "crazy" or that they are identifiable from a single profile 
or personality type. That movement represents a major step in the right 
direction. This shift has helped shape kinds of questions some researchers 
are asking, with less focus on "what kind of people are they?" and more 
attention to how people come to develop violent extremist ideologies or to 
engage with persons or groups that espouse them. This open-ended ques-
tion—how do some people step out on a pathway that takes them ulti-
mately to violent extremism—as an empirical matter, remains largely 
unanswered.
Borum: Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Journal of Strategic Security
56
With a useful set of starting assumptions and guidance from more mature 
social science theories, it may be possible to make more meaningful 
progress in studying and understanding RVE. Moving forward, here is a 
(notional) list of seven things that social science researchers and opera-
tional personnel need to know about violent radicalization:
1. How do individuals become engaged in violent extremist ideologies and 
with people and activities that instrumentally support terrorism? In 
particular, what is the role of social relationships (in-person or virtual) 
and bonds in facilitating belief and involvement?
2. What is the relative contribution of various "push" factors (i.e., griev-
ances and adverse sociopolitical conditions) and "pull" factors (or 
"lures," real and imagined rewards for aligning with a group) for par-
ticular individuals? How are "push" and "pull" factors conveyed 
through propaganda or narrative themes to resonate most strongly 
with individuals who become involved and engaged with violent 
extremism?
3. How and why does the nature of an individual's involvement and 
engagement with homegrown violent extremism change—or not—over 
time?
4. Why do most people with militant extremist beliefs not engage in vio-
lent action?
5. How do violent extremists (especially those in Western democracies) 
select their targets, and plan and prepare attacks, including patterns of 
communication, training, and operational tradecraft?
6. What key life factors, including past criminal activity or incarceration, 
and psychosocial vulnerabilities—if any—seem to be associated with an 
individual's entry into and engagement with violent extremism?
7. How can we measure progress in deterring radicalization into violent 
extremism and measure the success or effectiveness of rehabilitation 
programs (including an understanding of what works for whom)?
A potentially important implication of these unanswered questions, if it is 
not readily apparent, is that successful CVE efforts are likely to require 
more than "countering the narrative." The metaphorical notion of a "war 
on terrorism" has been largely re-cast as a "battle of ideas." That may turn 
out not to be the most useful metaphor, nor is it likely to account for the 
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variability among complex psychosocial RVE processes. Make no mis-
take; working in the information realm to mitigate perceived grievances is 
a worthwhile endeavor. But it is not a singular solution.
Conclusion
Peaceful nations around the world have been thrown into a lion's den of 
ideological extremists. Plans to defeat or neutralize an ideology, however, 
require different strategies, aims, and tactics than are used in a traditional 
war.27 Prevention is as important as eradication. Long-term strategic 
planning to counter terrorism must account for, if not emphasize, terror-
ist radicalization and recruitment. A clearer understanding must emerge 
of militant jihadism's appeal to young people and the tactics radicals use 
to mobilize them to take violent action.
This momentous effort must begin with conceptual clarity and a good 
faith attempt to gather facts and to analyze them with the goal of 
understanding the problem before leaping into large-scale and potentially 
deleterious solutions. This will require better thinking and better 
research.28 If radicalization into violent extremism conforms to many of 
the well-established principles of other known systems and 
developmental theories (and experience so far suggests that it does), the 
next generation of radicalization research—whether or not it chooses to 
use any of the theories suggested here—might consider the following 
assumptions as a starting point:
•   Radicalization is multi-determined; it is driven and sustained by multi-
ple causes, rather than a single cause. Causal factors often include 
broad grievances that "push" individuals toward a radical ideology and 
narrower, more specific "pull" factors that attract them;
•   Ideologies (and group support for them) develop within the human 
ecology of nested contexts and systems, including family, economic, 
social, and political structures;
•   Different pathways can lead to radicalization (sometimes called the 
principle of equifinality); conversely, different persons on a shared 
pathway or trajectory may have different outcomes (sometimes called 
the principle of multifinality).
•   For some persons, religion leverages their attachment to a grievance. 
For others, a grievance leverages their attachment to religion.
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•   For some, ideological commitment leads to group affiliation. For 
others, social or group affiliations lead to ideological commitments.
•   For some, the strength of personal conviction and commitment to 
the cause precedes their willingness to take subversive action. For 
others, engaging in subversive actions strengthens their personal 
conviction and commitment to the cause.
•   Not all terrorists even "radicalize."
•   Violent radicalization and engagement in terrorism is best viewed as a 
dynamic psychosocial process involving at least three phases: (1) 
becoming involved, (2) being involved—synonymous with engaging in 
unambiguous terrorist activity, and (3) disengaging (which may or may 
not result in subsequent de-radicalization). Engagement, moreover, 
comprises a variety of potential roles and functions, which individuals 
very often migrate both between and within, sometimes holding multi-
ple roles simultaneously.29
By beginning with these basic assumptions, we may at least avoid the mis-
take of viewing RVE as a monolith, and move on to formulate better ques-
tions that illuminate the commonalities and variants of the process, 
leading to more thoughtful and systematic initiatives for CVE. Under-
standing RVE has implications for all points on the CVE spectrum. Even 
simply thinking in terms of entry, engagement, and disengagement—and 
knowing that each phase can have distinct motivations and trajectories—
can help focus primary prevention efforts for inoculating vulnerable com-
munities and guide potential rehabilitation programs for detained terror-
ists. Effective CVE efforts will need to be built on new operational and 
strategic frames of reference with an explicit goal not just to eradicate 
existing terrorists, but also to thwart tomorrow's terrorists.
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